This week, Allegiant reported its Q1 earnings; empirical data strikes again. Management’s repeated claims during bargaining of financial “inabilities” fall on deaf ears, as the financial performance you delivered led the industry. During the call, management boasted of an industry-leading 18.1% EBITDA margin. That margin is 25% higher than Q1 2024, and the airline’s Operating Income margin is at least double that of jetBlue, Southwest, Frontier, United, or Delta. Remember, margins are scale-neutral and are used to compare the relative financial performance of carriers of different sizes. Allegiant is undeniably among the head of the pack.

Despite the accrual of your retention bonus and a new Flight Attendant contract, Cost per Available Seat Mile (CASM) actually decreased compared to Q1 2024. On the operational front, our pilots continued to deliver a controllable completion rate of 99.2% on 32,000 departures for the quarter. This is despite management’s previous false claims that cancellations are largely driven by the Bloch Award. Consider these data points from the last earnings call:

Revenue Growth: Airline operating revenue increased by 5.7% to $668M in the 1st Quarter, which is historically the worst financial quarter for U.S. airlines.

Profit Margin Growth: Airline operating income increased by nearly 150% (not a typo) to $60.9M, delivering a 9.3 % operating margin, double that of United or Delta. Operating margin increased from 3.8% in 2024, an increase of 5.3 percentage points.

Huge EBITDA Margins: Adjusted airline-only EBITDA margin was over 18%—well above any LCC/ULCC and nearly double most legacy carriers.

Cost Decrease: CASMex minus special charges decreased by 9%, including the accrual of the pilot retention bonus and the new Flight Attendant Contract.

Ancillary Gains: Even without increasing base fares, ancillary revenue increased by nearly 5% per passenger.

Utilization Increase: Utilization has increased by 20% YoY.

Scaled Reliability: 99.9% controllable completion rate with a 14% increase in capacity crushing the company’s claims that reliability and growth were impacted by the 0% unstacked, protecting, post-Bloch Award CBI solution.

This is pure profitability, not poverty. The company is not in “survival” mode despite management’s claims to the contrary. Despite this excellent performance and strong demand for leisure travel, management continues to insist that a concessionary contract with worse-than-Spirit rules and below average with extreme and unprecedented levels of forced flying is critical for their “survival”. The answer is no.

Our position is strengthened by data and the parties remain at an impasse.

Who are our Customers and Competitors?

Management insists that carriers like Spirit, Frontier, Avelo, and Sun Country are those that they “directly compete with.” Data strikes again (and not in their favor). Management has made it crystal clear to Wall Street that Allegiant is not a ULCC by classification or business model, and none of the aforementioned carriers are our “direct competitors”. Why they feel the need to lie to you is a mystery, but it is a fact that less than 5% of Allegiant’s customers come from Frontier (and only 3% of them from Spirit). Consider the following from management’s presentation to Wall Street:

Figure: Passenger Composition, Allegiant Investor Presentation

84 % of new Allegiant customers are customers of the “Big 4” — Southwest, Delta, American, or United. In fact, Allegiant has a 40 %+ Total Revenue per Available Seat Mile (TRASM) advantage over both Frontier and Spirit (even at nine pilots per aircraft). TRASM, by management’s own admission, is more aligned with brand carriers like jetBlue and Alaska than ULCCs. A fair, truly market-based contract for the pilots who deliver this industry-leading performance is revenue and margin-accretive, and non-negotiable at this juncture.

Former Allegiant COO Speaks Out About JV

We certainly don’t need management to validate our concerns regarding protecting U.S. jobs, but former Allegiant Chief Operating Officer Jude Bricker’s recent comments on Allegiant’s proposed JV deserve serious consideration. As Allegiant intensifies its efforts to outsource its flying to foreign carriers, Bricker publicly challenged management’s narrative at the latest CAPA leaders’ summit. While Allegiant claims that the JV is its only competitive pathway to international flying, Bricker pushed back, stating:

“Allegiant can fly to Mexico any time they want. There’s nothing the DOT does to prevent that.” -Jude Bricker Former Allegiant COO and CEO of Sun Country

The Viva JV in its current form is simply about outsourcing U.S. pilot jobs and flying opportunities, and not about expanding “consumer access” to international markets. When management claimed this JV would be “revolutionary” for international travel, Bricker countered:

“If [Allegiant] wants to outsource U.S. crew jobs to a Mexican carrier … I don’t see why that’s on brand to this [Presidential] administration.” -Jude Bricker, Former Allegiant COO and CEO of Sun Country

When management claimed that the JV is necessary to gain sufficient access to Mexican markets and compete with legacy carriers, Bricker noted that carriers with far fewer resources than Allegiant—including Breeze and Sun Country—already serve Mexico with U.S. based crews and no joint venture.

“You know the airport that is a Delta hub that doesn’t have Aeromexico service, Minneapolis. Why? Because we do.” -Jude Bricker, Former Allegiant COO and CEO of Sun Country

This is not Allegiant’s first attempt to outsource flying—your 757 flying to Honolulu was proposed to be outsourced to Ryanair until pilots drew a line. The time is upon us to draw the line again. Allegiant can launch Mexico service with Allegiant pilots presently, if they choose. This Union will continue to oppose any venture that does not protect U.S. jobs and guarantee Allegiant pilots their fair share of future growth and flying.

You can read the full article here.

Fort Lauderdale Transition MOU

Fort Lauderdale (FLL) is among the bases next in line for a fleet transition from A320 to B737. In an email to the FLL pilots in reference to the transition, Captain Hardesty bravely claimed that the MOU “should not be controversial, as it is already part of the Section 12 AIP that the union and company have negotiated and agreed to”. Whether this is ignorance of the bargaining process or a blatant contempt remains uncertain.

Any agreement achieved during collective bargaining over a new CBA is not available for implementation on an individual basis. As with any agreement, and especially an AIP, those terms are contingent upon the remaining outstanding terms in the contract. An AIP may become a full language TA, or it may not, but agreements on individual parts of the contract do not take effect until there is a complete, ratified contract. Management cannot cherry-pick agreements (or portions thereof) achieved during bargaining that they want to implement or “lock in” at their convenience via MOU. That’s not how it works; every pilot labor Union agrees.

Management’s statement that it is not “controversial” to attempt to use an MOU to secure terms currently under dispute in bargaining is absurd. Manufacturing a controversy to erode pilot trust in the Union and force the Union to accept terms outside of bargaining is not good faith bargaining. Further, management inferred that the FLL pilots would be harmed by their requirement to adhere to the terms of the CBA. This is false.

First, management has the means within the CBA to minimize or eliminate any hardship the affected pilots would face by opening the requisite number of vacancies (with appropriate excess) for B737 Captains and First Officers in FLL. This ensures that those pilots who wish to remain in FLL have every opportunity to do so. Management suggested that they would not/could not do so, yet since the Union held its ground and rejected the MOU, it appears that they have done exactly that. Second, those pilots who choose not to bid for the B737 in the vacancy will be afforded their displacement rights per the CBA, despite any management claim to the contrary. If the Company deviates from the CBA, the union will take all necessary action to defend the rights of the pilot group.

Our contract must be followed. TAs or AIPs achieved during bargaining do not change that. Management should be aware that no agreements achieved during bargaining are available on an individual, piece-meal basis.

If they want those terms, sign a new contract.

Misleading Capacity “Reductions”

Management will continue to sound the economic alarm to create fear and doubt in our pilot group. Regarding their statements about capacity reductions, it is worth noting that these reductions are still increases in year-over-year (YoY) figures. For example, August is still a 16% increase in ASMs and a 17% increase in block hours YoY. While management may wish to induce panic, the data shows that this is not a panic-inducing scenario in any sense. While it is reasonable to expect that Allegiant may slow some growth to match the economy, they will likely grow faster than most other U.S. airlines. Your expectations for a fair, market-based contract should remain unchanged.

General Bargaining Updates

The company has until Tuesday, May 13th, 2025, to submit their comments to the NMB in reference to our proffer of arbitration request. We will keep you informed of further developments as they occur.

In Closing

Since bargaining began, this management group has given you few reasons to trust them. They continue to erode the little remaining trust, if any, through their backhanded tactics (LAX MOU, training center rumors and leaks, etc.) on an almost hourly basis. Despite this, they will do everything possible to convince you that your Union is the problem. This management team can’t even offer the market‑based working conditions that peer carriers already provide their pilots. These provisions work with Allegiant’s “unique” business model as have been proven through testing and empirical data.

Even still, they will tell tall tales to any pilot willing to listen. “Your Negotiating Committee is the problem,” they’ll say. “They just don’t want a contract,” they’ll claim. Give that some serious thought. Your Negotiating Committee isn’t on a special pay scale or receiving some direct retirement contribution/pension/stock option scheme you don’t get. We are a committee of your peers, and there is absolutely no motivation for us to delay a fair contract – we get better work rules and raises at the same time you do. Management is a different story.

Delays save them money and wear you down. They want to stall a fair contract because it’s in their best interest. They will delay and string you along until you demand, in unison, that management deliver a fair, market-based contract to our pilots immediately, beginning with resolving the current impasse by accepting the Union’s data-based unstacking proposal. Your Negotiating Committee will continue to prepare each day to get this contract across the finish line through data analysis, strategy, and preparation, and provide you with as much information as is permissible so you can remain engaged and informed.

It is time to stand together, unified, unapologetic about what you deserve, without fear of management or the vocal minority who believe you are worth concessions. Stand behind your brothers and sisters in the fight for what you deserve. We must show respect and dignity for our profession; we can’t wait for another carrier to carry the torch for us in hopes to pattern bargain from their efforts a decade from now. Every other pilot group has fought hard for what they have. The Allegiant pilots must do the same. The unique distinction of having both industry-leading financial performance and an industry-worst pilot contract ends now.

Four years in negotiations will not result in concessions or backwards progress. An immediate, fair, market-based contract is the only option we will accept at this juncture in negotiations.

In Unity,

Captain Joshua Allen
Negotiating Committee Chairman

Captain Jay Killen
Pilot Negotiator

Captain Brad Keller
Pilot Negotiator

Captain J.R. Lynch
Chief of Staff

Captain Jim Cole
Recording Analyst

Copyright (C) 2025 Allegiant Pilots Association, Teamsters Local Union 2118. All rights reserved.

You are receiving this email as a member of APA Teamsters Local 2118.

Happy Easter to All Who Celebrate

We hope that our fellow pilots and your families had a great Easter weekend. We know this holiday comes at a frustrating time for many as our work for a fair contract and successful, cooperative future at Allegiant continues. Even still, we hope you were able to step back this past weekend and spend meaningful time with loved ones. Regardless of the noise, we should all remember to appreciate the quiet moments—they’re what we’re ultimately fighting to protect. We should all take time as often as we possibly can to remember what truly matters.

Different Year, Same Story

Management has a long history of attempting to undermine staffing and negotiations over scheduling. Using a data driven approach or empirical evidence has never been satisfactory to management when the numbers don’t support the Company’s demands, making it very difficult to reach an agreement on fair terms. If the Union provided any such evidence, Allegiant would try to discredit the results claiming that then current staffing is “not indicative” of the staffing levels of the future (read: they want less).

Consider the following Union update from our second round of mediation over PBS in 2019:

Your ExCo recently requested bid data so that we could compare [the PBS solution] to CBI results. In an effort to achieve full transparency, we would like to show the mediator empirical data in the form of bid results that show that the company is absolutely capable of solving our bids without unstacking and with equivalent coverage. True to form however, the company has denied our absolutely reasonable request stating “Allegiant has explained to the Union in the past, the airline is overstaffed and plans to reduce its pilot headcount over time through attrition. As such, scheduling information from Allegiant’s present operations is not indicative of what stacking and unstacking limitations may ultimately be viable once Allegiant’s pilot headcount is appropriately adjusted.” 

After our last update, some pilots questioned whether Allegiant management had the willingness or operational capacity to significantly reduce headcount. While they may be coy about their intentions today, the Allegiant management of old was upfront about their intention to slash staffing to the minimum levels. They realized that through the natural efficiency of PBS and high levels of unstacking (ignoring your preferences), they could schedule pilots at their leisure and reduce headcount to levels significantly below any other major airline.

Consider the following Union update from PBS mediation in 2018:

“When we asked why, the company said over and over that while [the PBS solution] was able to give them a good result, they didn’t know what the solution would look like when they “corrected” the pilot headcount after the fleet transition. When we asked what that meant, the company explained that we currently have 9.6 pilots per aircraft in the fleet. They will be “correcting” the number after the fleet transition to 7.1 pilots per aircraft. How does the company think they can do this? Because they have realized how efficient a real PBS solution can be in comparison to the home-built excel spreadsheet they are currently using.”

Even during our mediation in 2018, management wanted a 26% headcount reduction from already industry low staffing levels. For reference, even at our current, post-Bloch staffing level, we estimate Allegiant is over 20% less than comparable carriers. When you examine the numbers more closely on a block hour basis, Allegiant extracts 30+% greater block hour productivity per pilot in peak periods than the next nearest comparator on a relative basis based on publicly available data.

Example: Approximate Pilot Count Per Aircraft

The Allegiant pilot always does more with less. In fact, it took almost 20 years for our pilots to secure even the most basic seniority protections, thanks in large part to Richard Bloch’s landmark arbitration decision. We have no intention of “forcing” the company to arbitrarily increase headcount. Our interest is in protecting what we have and what our pilots have fought for and rightfully earned through years of mediation, arbitration, and litigation.
There is no interest in contract provisions that give management the ability to significantly reduce headcount, completely devalue your hard earned seniority rights or your quality of life. Short of bankruptcy, no labor union has or would agree to such extreme concessions to fund their future contract. Our pilots expect nothing less.

“Buying” Your Own Pay Raise

After nearly four years of mediation, litigation, and arbitration, Arbitrator Richard Bloch delivered a landmark ruling in 2020 that finally ended years of scheduling contract violations and restored our seniority rights as guaranteed by the agreement that we negotiated. Unwilling to adhere to the clear, unambiguous language in our contract and the binding arbitration ruling, management resisted and filed suit in federal court to overturn the Bloch award. In 2022, their appeal was denied, and the threat of scheduling without regard for seniority or preferences was permanently put to bed – or so we thought.

It has been made clear that the Allegiant pilots are expected to fund their own pay raises through concessionary scheduling “efficiencies”. These include a reversal of the Bloch award under CBI as well as the ability to ignore preferences for the majority of our pilots after PBS is implemented. The Allegiant pilots have made it clear that this is unacceptable.

Retention Bonus Concerns

Several pilots have expressed concern about the company’s intention or requirement to pay the retention bonus upon ratification of a contract or in the event of a strike. The Negotiating Committee will not use the retention bonus agreement as a negotiating device under any circumstance. As per the original agreement, pilots should expect that the entire retention bonus shall be paid within sixty (60) days of contract ratification.

If we strike, do I lose my retention bonus?

A legal strike has no effect on the retention bonus agreement. The Union will not entertain the elimination or reduction of the retention bonus agreement as a part of any return-to-work agreement negotiated with the company. The eligibility for bonus payment requirements are set forth in Paragraph 1.a. and 1.b of the Interim Agreement: a) you remain actively employed with the Company through the ratification date of the Parties’ amended CBA; or b) you retire from the Company’s employ due to reaching the FAA mandatory retirement age prior to the ratification date of the Parties’ amended CBA. A strike does not divest a pilot who satisfies the above criteria of their right to payment of their retention bonus. Management cannot suggest, infer, or explicitly state that they will refuse to honor the terms of your retention bonus payment in the event of a legal strike.

If you have been a part of any such discussion with management, report it immediately to negotiations@apa2118.org.

General Bargaining Updates

Last week, we formally submitted a request for a proffer of arbitration and status meeting request from the National Mediation Board (NMB). In response, the NMB requested that Allegiant provide their comments no later than 29 April 2025. Allegiant requested a 2-week extension from the board so that they can “adequately respond to the Union’s assertions and provide the Board with the full context of the parties’ bargaining.” The request was granted and the deadline for management to provide their comments regarding our proffer was extended to May 13, 2025.

The Negotiating Committee had a virtual meeting with the mediator on Friday, April 18th, 2025. The parties are scheduled to meet for a joint mediation next week on Thursday, April 24th, 2025. We will keep you updated regarding any further developments.

Protect and Enforce – Understanding Contract Language

The goal of your Negotiating Committee is simple, enforceable contract language. Our pilots frequently assume contract provisions are clear—until weak or ambiguous wording is used against them. If it’s not enforceable, it is exploitable. Consider the Company’s proposed unstacking language:

Example: Excerpt from company email to pilots on December 18th

In December, the management publicly shared details of its above-quoted unstacking proposal in PBS. They characterized their proposal as having “50/70% unstacking limits” and strongly suggested that these limits were confined to “peak vs. non-peak” respectively. The truth is that this language had no requirement to prove necessity for 70%, no limit on frequency, and no mechanism for the union to review or challenge that justification. There isn’t a fixed limit or peak vs. non-peak provision. This language is wide open and easily exploited to the detriment of your seniority and quality of life. You may have already noticed the following:

“Unable to Provide a Result” Clause = Full Management Discretion

The statement “if the CBI/Solver is not able to provide a result” is ambiguous enough to be interpreted broadly and without limitation. “Solver Failure” immediately triggers higher unstacking, even if such a failure is the result of solver manipulation (as was past practice), artificial constraints, poor company planning, and/or unrealistic scheduling/staffing assumptions.

Normalizing 70% and the “Single Trip” Clause

If the “solver fails” on just one single day across a bid period, 70% unstacking is triggered. Even if there are just two “uncovered trip” on any given day, a virtual certainty if any open time is allowed to exist, then the company can ignore the preferences of 70% of line holders. For reference, 12 of our 22 bases had at least 2 uncovered trips on any given day in March 2025. Even the most minor staffing inefficiency or intentional over-scheduling triggers the limit to 70%. In short, there is no 50% limit, nor any “peak vs. non-peak” limitations in this language. It is at least 70% in virtually all cases.

70% – A Soft Limit

Another unique “feature” of this language is the so-called “unstacking limit”. By definition, a limit is not to be exceeded. The language appears to clearly express a hard limit, then in the very next clause builds in a way to bypass it. The language states:

“…up to, but not beyond, 70% of the regular line holders…”

Then the “funny math”:

“…70% unstacking limit will be calculated as follows…multiplied by 0.7…rounded up…”

If you need extra math to calculate an already mathematically defined limit, it is simply a loophole disguised as a rule.
Over 3,000 scheduling grievances and countless arbitrations, mediations, and lawsuits under the current CBA. Enough is enough. We deserve a fair contract with simple, enforceable language. We do not deserve yet another grievance making machine that sets more major airline records for arbitrations and litigation. We appreciate your support in getting it right and holding the company accountable to their end of the negotiating bargain.

Committee Changes

We welcome Captain Brad Keller to the Negotiating Committee. Captain Keller is a Line Check Airman, serves as a Steward and SPC Representative for Local 2118, and is the current chairman of the G4 Pilot Assistance Fund, LLC. Captain Keller is a former United States Marine, and has been in the airline industry since 2007. Allegiant is his 5th Airline and this will be his 4th contract. We look forward to his line oriented insight and operational experience as we intensify our efforts to reach a fair agreement at the earliest possible opportunity. Although management has informed the Union that they intend to reject his addition to the committee, the Union intends to challenge this decision.

In Closing

We are especially grateful for the many messages of support and encouragement we received over the last several days. Your Negotiating Committee is a team of your peers and we remain committed to delivering a fair contract that we can all be proud of. We continue to work tirelessly toward that goal, and we appreciate your engagement, your questions, your trust, and your support. Thank you for continuing to hold management accountable for the contract they promised you.

We look forward to delivering an agreement worthy of your vote in the very near future.

In Unity,

Captain Joshua Allen
Negotiating Committee Chairman

Captain Jay Killen
Pilot Negotiator

Captain Brad Keller
Pilot Negotiator

Captain J.R. Lynch
Chief of Staff

Captain Jim Cole
Recording Analyst

Copyright (C) 2025 Allegiant Pilots Association, Teamsters Local Union 2118. All rights reserved.

You are receiving this email as a member of APA Teamsters Local 2118.

Forced Work + No Preferences = Less Pilots

This is a simple, data-driven exercise that you can imagine for yourself. If you own a business and can force your employees to work at-will, on the days of your choosing, you need significantly less people in your workforce. In the case of an airline, if your only “structural” limits are FAR Part 117 rules and a few limited scheduling provisions, both the number of pilots in the workforce and the resultant quality of life for those pilots who remain reduce dramatically. Our pilots are a resource to invest in, not simply a property-like cost that must be controlled as management prefers.

Management has not been coy about their desire to minimize headcount and increase productivity through force. The only cost is your quality of life, your real earnings, and fewer pilots on property – sacrifices management is obviously willing to make. Management repeats the “unique business model” and “operational necessity” excuse, hoping for emotionally driven concessions. Fortunately, data is not swayed by emotion. High unstacking/forced work is not a “necessity for our unique operation” and the data proves it. Removing your seniority from the equation and forcing work is a wholly unacceptable concessionary proposal that predates these negotiations.

The idea that giving management a concessionary contract is necessary for the company’s survival is nonsense. In conjunction with a strong business model, a fair contract increases productivity and profits. Airlines like Southwest and Alaska achieved record earnings under new pilot contracts, while still respecting seniority and providing for a decent quality of life. Allegiant would be wise to do the same.

Continued Clarification Regarding Current CBI

There continues to be some misinformation regarding schedule, specifically that the company’s offer is superior to CBI with respect to honoring seniority and preferences. It is worth repeating that CBI is a 0% unstacked solution as guaranteed by the Bloch award. The company’s proposal on PBS represents a major concession from the current contract.

Some think, “My schedule is great, I don’t see the problem”.

Your schedule is satisfactory because the Bloch award guarantees that your seniority is honored in CBI. The status quo will change and will be worse under the company’s proposal. In the company’s proposed scheduling environment, broad, new unstacking rights would give the company the ability to ignore seniority and build schedules entirely at management’s discretion. Management has previously made it clear that any improvement to pilot pay must be tied to concessions in scheduling. In their proposal, you are buying your pay rates through giving up seniority, your quality of life, and sacrificing our junior pilots.

As any labor union would, we find this proposal wholly unacceptable.

Disciplined Bargaining

The RLA bargaining process is time consuming, difficult, and frustrating. Many pilots question why we remain in mediation when the company and Union have not been able to reach an agreement on fundamental working conditions while management engages in bad faith behavior, shows a lack of cooperation, and disregard for the bargaining process. First, the National Mediation Board alone determines if and when the parties are released from the mandatory mediation process. Second, as discussed below, we wanted to use all of the means at our disposal to try to reach an agreement before we requested a release to self-help, which is a costly, last resort option available to both parties if released from mediation by the NMB. Because of its potential economic impact, self-help is never the desired outcome, but sometimes the only viable way to reach a fair and enforceable agreement.

There is no operational need for the company’s concessionary and extreme bargaining demands. Moreover, through deliberate stalling, misinformation campaigns, and bad faith tactics, management has attempted to use mandatory mediation time to wear down and divide the Union. They know that the RLA process requires the parties to spend a substantial amount of time in negotiations before being released by the NMB, and they attempt to use that delay to their advantage—engaging in “surface bargaining” to make minimum progress while creating division in our ranks in an attempt to entice pilots to accept concessions and settle for less.

Instead of frequently complaining, we used a disciplined, data-driven approach to provide solutions to each and every company problem they presented, no matter how “unsolvable” or trivial, in an attempt to reach agreements; we could not. We kept detailed records of the company’s behavior, including shifting positions, their near “unsolvable” parameters and frequent obstructionism.

We believe a 30-day cooling off period, followed by self-help, if no tentative agreement is reached, is necessary to produce a contract. We have a well-documented, evidence-based case to present to the National Mediation Board (NMB) should a status meeting be granted. Our reports include a detailed record of why we have reached an impasse, the company’s conduct at and away from the bargaining table, the Union’s good-faith efforts, and our conclusion that a release to self-help is justified and necessary to reach a fair agreement.

Self-Help Process FAQ

Based on our filing to the NMB requesting release from mediation, some of our pilots have additional questions regarding the NMB bargaining process, the status of mediation, and the possibility of self-help. Over the next several updates, we will attempt to answer all of your outstanding questions. Additionally, expect more communication and to receive a Strike Preparation Handbook from the SPC.

1. Is there a timeline or time limit for the NMB to respond to the Union’s request “for a proffer of arbitration”?

No. The NMB has full discretion and there is no mandatory timeline to respond to a request for a proffer of arbitration, the formal name for a request to be released from mediation. There is no statutory deadline and the NMB will base their decision on multiple factors. A status meeting between the parties and the NMB may occur before a decision on our proffer request will be made. During the status meeting, the Union will present its evidence-based case for how the company’s proposals and conduct have created the current impasse. If a status conference occurs, management will also be given the opportunity to present its case.

2. How long does the process generally take if the mediator grants our request? When can self help begin?

To clarify, while mediators provide their opinion to the NMB, mediators do not grant or deny a request for a proffer of arbitration. A proffer request and related decisions are made by the three member, presidentially appointed NMB members. If the NMB makes the proffer of arbitration and either party rejects arbitration (which the Union will), then the 30-day cooling-off period before self-help can legally begin starts immediately. The parties can lawfully engage in self-help immediately after the cooling off period expires.

3. What is self-help and what can the Union do during that time?

It is commonly misunderstood that self-help simply means a strike alone. In reality, self-help applies to both parties equally under the law. During self-help, the Union may legally strike the employer, either in full or in an intermittent, unpredictable fashion. At the same time, the employer can lock out employees and unilaterally change wages, rules, and/or working conditions (e.g., implement the “mailer”) in an attempt to encourage pilots to cross the picket line to work (“scabbing”). An employer can also attempt to hire replacement workers, although the training for flight crews makes this costly and impractical.

4. If the NMB grants our request, what should we expect and how long will it take?

There is no timeline for the NMB to make a decision on a request for a proffer of arbitration/release. If the NMB decides to make a proffer, the parties will be notified that the NMB has terminated its services and is making a proffer of binding arbitration. The parties will either accept or reject arbitration. If either or both parties refuse arbitration, the NMB immediately releases the parties into a 30-day cooling off period.

During the 30-day period, it is common for the parties to engage in “super mediation.” This is a compressed period of multiple, intense bargaining sessions with the intent of reaching an agreement to avoid a strike. If this does not lead to an agreement, the parties will be released to self-help at the end of the cooling off period.

5. If the NMB does not grant the request, what happens?

If the NMB believes that further mediation without economic pressure could be productive and lead to an agreement, the request may be denied. The parties will remain in mandatory mediation. The Union believes that it has gone well beyond every reasonable effort to make an agreement. We do not believe further “no stakes” mediation will lead to an agreement.

Your Duty as a Pilot

Consider the source; they’re not “just like us” – Regardless of their flying background, managers are just that, managers. They aren’t “just like us” and they aren’t “here to help.” These former line pilots are not like you and do not bargain for your best interest. Most have vested stock options, the freedom to control their own schedules, and they won’t live under the contract they are negotiating “for you.” Should they ever return to the line, they’ll have the privilege of avoiding the worst of whatever is negotiated through their seniority.

Combat Misinformation – There is a significant amount of misinformation being spread on non-official forums and group chats. It is every pilot’s duty to speak up and out against misinformation, especially against those most clearly aligned with management’s agenda to undermine our unity and subvert the Union’s bargaining authority. Silence is surrender.

Report Illegal Behavior – By law, management cannot interfere with union affairs in any manner, especially one which affects their ability to bargain or represent its members. Inappropriate and reportable behavior includes, but is not limited to:

• A manager suggesting, encouraging, or directing a “decertification” or “start an ALPA drive” effort in any form, as some managers have been known to do (including those managers who approached members of your Negotiating Committee asking them to participate in such actions).
• A Check Airman or Instructor who utilizes a training session, scheduled or “surprise” line check, or other official event to disparage or undermine the union, encourage certain political outcomes, or similar behavior. Any training/checking event should be free from Union, management, or political pressures.
• Management conversations (including calls, texts, or emails) with line pilots about their preferences for Union representatives or representation, or how to resolve disputed issues during negotiations.
• Any individual, manager or otherwise, who actively colludes with Allegiant to undermine the representational effectiveness of the Union.

Report any suspected violations to negotiations@apa2118.org. As we prepare for a potential status meeting with the NMB, additional reports will be particularly useful over the coming days and weeks.

In Closing

Thank you for your support. We look forward to delivering an agreement worthy of your vote very soon.

In Unity,

Captain Joshua Allen
Negotiating Committee Chairman

Captain Jay Killen
Pilot Negotiator

Captain J.R. Lynch
Chief of Staff

Captain Jim Cole
Recording Analyst

Copyright (C) 2025 Allegiant Pilots Association, Teamsters Local Union 2118. All rights reserved.

You are receiving this email as a member of APA Teamsters Local 2118.